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I.  Introduction 
New institutional economics is a thriving field that gives thought to many relevant 
questions plaguing the world economy today.  At the heart of these challenges, lies sub 
optimal economic growth for many of the world’s poorest countries as well as government 
obstructions to achieving shared prosperity.  Growth factors need to be accompanied by 
progressive institutions (public) that stimulate incentive based markets where innovation 
and individual achievement reign supreme.   
The intention of this study is to use recent economic theory grounded by new 
institutionalism in order to assess varying degrees of institutional development and the 
implications it has for growth.  Also, by expanding on Kenneth Arrow’s insistence that 
keen observation must always be present in modern, mathematics driven economics, I 
showcase a breadth of examples from the past century to the present, to further make my 
case.  Naturally, I rely on empirical techniques based on regression analysis to validate or 
reject arguments based on literature review and historical analysis of the subject.   
I also review the new institutional economics literature primarily from 1990-2012.  In 
addition, it is important to identify various countries that can be exemplified in order to 
relate institutional development to differing levels of economic growth.  This will be 
instrumental in integrating the conceptual model to possible results from empirical work.   
The main findings could possibly provide evidence in line with my a priori intuition 
that good institutions are highly correlated with economic growth.  Good institutions can be 
described as those that stimulate free-market performance, support innovations and 
technological change, and ultimately guarantee economic freedom and individual liberties.  
However, it is worth noting that economic growth can happen under extractive institutions 
such as modern day China, where a politically repressed population manages to obtain a 
higher quality of living.1 
Each section will consist of specific goals that will lead to conclusions and 
recommendations at the end.  The introduction briefly states the motivation for this project 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1An interesting argument by MIT economist Arvind Subramanian states that the modernization     
hypothesis is relevant to this discussion about China’s future.  The modernization hypothesis states 
that higher living standards will encourage citizen outcries and struggles for a more democratic 
government.	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and delimits the scope of the results that can be achieved.  The research question and 
problem are the baseline for writing a research paper on a specific topic.  The problem of 
study arises from casual observation of economic realities and also from reading the latest 
and most relevant literature on this particular topic.  The objectives are both general and 
specific, so I explicitly state what is to be accomplished with this work.  A literature review 
section should cover the most important literature and should connect economic theory to 
the specific, conceptual problem that is trying to be solved.  The hypotheses section is 
especially interesting because I can corroborate an initial “hunch” with empirical results at 
the end.  The methodology details how to proceed with testing my hypotheses and working 
out a feasible explanation of the problem.  In addition, there is a conceptual model that 
analytically argues as to why this type of study is relevant.  Furthermore, this section will 
be supported by a historical analysis of institutions and some evident consequences for 
various countries.  Reliable data is of critical importance for the success of this analysis and 
the limitations of data will also be addressed in the appropriate section.  Conclusions and 
recommendations provide relevant insight based on actual results and also certain 
recommendations or suggestions involving possible social changes to improve certain 
institutions.   
 
II.  Problem 
Historically, many political regimes have judged a country’s performance by 
economic performance.  When one studies economic performance, it is natural to calculate 
GDP growth and more precisely real GDP variations per capita.  If one decides to study 
development, which can translate into prosperity for nations and their respective 
populations; then it is impossible to neglect factors such as standards of living, perceptions 
about government, violence, and expropriation risks, among others.  Since new institutional 
economics addresses issues related to poverty, failed states, corruption, inequality and many 
others; it makes sense to incorporate this theoretical backbone into the empirical model 
which will try to gain further ground for this institutional approach to growth.   
 Many approaches to growth consider factors that are not consistently significant in 
describing why some countries prosper while others fail.  For example, some scholars have 
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studied the importance of geographic factors, cultural factors, religious factors, natural 
endowments, population size, and others in order to sketch out a plausible theory about 
growth.  If some of these factors do prove significant, it is a mere coincidence and not a 
holistic truth concerning growth (Acemoglu, Simon, and Robinson, 2000).  Testing for 
good institutional development in regard to sustained economic growth would shed light on 
a better way of understanding the economic outcomes of nations.  By carefully reviewing 
new institutionalism and its literature, it should be possible to work out a solid theoretical 
foundation regarding good institutional development and positive economic outcomes.   
 
III. Objectives 
a) General  
The main objective of this paper is to study new institutional economics as the main 
economic theory behind institutional development that leads to the long run economic 
growth of nations.  
 
b) Specific 
The paper consists of a new institutional economics literature review largely from 1990-
2012 that argues for the relevance of institutional development in studying economic 
growth.  Also, the economic theory behind institutional development advocates the 
necessity of thoroughly understanding and articulating historical factors with institutional 
realities and their impact on growth.  Furthermore, the relation between institutions and 
growth must be tested, and an empirical model is to be estimated to corroborate new 
institutional theory.   
 
IV.  Literature Review 
Economic growth can pertain to both industry analysis or also to macro level studies.  In 
the latter case, the main interest revolves around country level data and specifically what 
degree of institutional development can be attained.  The sample data will include all 
available data for all countries and all available time frames.  Since it is a macro level 
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study, most of the variables will be well known to readers but perhaps most will not be 
aware of the magnitude each variable can have on a final outcome.   
 The conceptual model will be grounded on the fundamental theories of new 
institutional economics.  Clearly, good institutions will better equip countries for economic 
success and prosperity in the long run (Acemoglu, Simon, and Robinson, 2000)2.  The 
central thesis behind this is that adequate institutions secure property rights and the sanctity 
of contracts, which are prerequisites for innovation and entrepreneurship.  It is important to 
stress the idea of a long run perspective, because many policy makers have been deceived 
by short-term gains while completely ignoring structural flaws.  More specifically, this 
argument can be evidenced by governments’ decisions to assure central bank independence 
to avoid political manipulation or temptation to shoot for short-term growth during election 
periods.  Economic success naturally depends on factors such as foreign direct investment 
as mentioned by Cárdenas (2009).  Also, expropriation risks have large economic 
implications for many countries that demonstrate these tendencies.  Governability indexes 
capture how well a government can exercise authority based on its institutional power to 
deliver public goods to its population.  I can be more specific in defining good governing 
ability by adhering to the guidelines laid out by The World Bank (2009) which stress the 
following: 
1) The degree to which citizens can actively engage in and participate in official 
elections, freedom of speech, and media and communications. 
2) Political stability, absence of criminal activity, and terrorism as perceived by 
citizens.  This view takes into account the probability of a government being 
overthrown by criminal or rebellious behavior. 
3) The effectiveness of government in delivering public services and civil service.  
This indicator also assesses government credibility and governments’ transparency 
and commitment to fulfill and deliver on promises.   
4) The measure of the absence of fiscal burdens which detriment private sector 
initiatives and incentives to invest and create. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Non-extractive institutions that elevate welfare and encourage a competitive market place where 
corruption is minimal and property rights are guaranteed.  	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5) The measures of citizens’ perceptions of government ability to assure legal 
sanctions, property rights, impunity, among others.  It basically results in a 
trustworthiness indicator to determine if a government truly acts in the best interest 
of its citizens.   
6) Perhaps the most common of all: corruption perception.  This indicator attempts to 
quantify not only direct government corruption but also corruption levels of “elites” 
or some private sector agents.   
 
The Institutional approach to economics can be traced back to Thorstein Veblen, 
although Ronald Coase is better known for relating economics to law and studying 
institutions and their economic outcome.  For starters, Coase (1937) and the approach to 
externalities known amongst economists as the Coase theorem has allowed researchers to 
expand on the importance of property rights.  The theorem states that when there is a 
conflict concerning property rights, individual negotiation and bargaining leads to a better, 
more efficient outcome than any particular assigned property rights.  Basically, the 
principle assertion behind the Coase theorem believes a competitive marketplace will 
dictate which firm is able to oust the other and property rights will not deter an optimal 
solution to this game theoretical problem.   
Following the work of Coase, Douglas North, a Nobel Laureate as well, has 
extensively written and expanded on property rights and how adequate enforcement 
provides necessary incentives for economic activity.  Also, there are primitive ways of life 
that do not relate to the concept of private property North (1991) because land is believed to 
come from nature which intuitively means there is no individual ownership but instead the 
collective use for common benefit.  For example, many Indian tribes in Colombia are 
greatly ostracized; therefore they find comfort among themselves.  In their society, they 
strive to produce food and to earn distinction among their peers; they do not however have 
incentives or many opportunities to compete and earn their place in Colombia’s market-
based economy.     
In newer literature, primarily Acemoglu (2008) and Robinson (2008), argue that 
institutional development is the main driver behind long-lived prosperity.  A striking 
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example of this is the Soviet Union meltdown after decades of incredible economic 
performance.  The leading politicians and policymakers of the day feared losing power and 
decided to regulate and keep a tight grip on innovation and technological change.  Again, 
the main point rests with the idea of inter-temporal choices and present sacrifice for greater 
benefit in the future.  Although enticing to reap benefits today, proper institutional 
development requires constant change and innovation that gives way to a dynamic economy 
where free market incentives always persist.  Schumpeterian economics is based on 
technological change bringing about “creative destruction” where the newer, more efficient 
methods leave the old aside in a constantly evolving and competitive society.  This model 
critiques modern day China and how strong central planning can lead to a path that 
resembles the late Soviet Union.  Perhaps the most relevant arguments in favor of an 
institutional approach to growth are put forward by Acemoglu (2008) and Robinson (2008) 
in using real world examples to justify that cultural, religious, geographic, natural 
resources, and other barriers are not the fundamental explanations of why countries fail or 
succeed in the long run.  Empirical models that test for the significance of institutions need 
to include key variables such as: corruption, expropriation, political risk, property rights, 
democratic freedom, and other institutional development indicators (Aron, 2000).   
To summarize, the role of institutions in economic growth and development can be 
notably traced to Douglass North and his contributions that earned him a Nobel Prize in 
economics.  Ronald Coase is best known as the founder of new institutional economics, and 
also expanded on critical elements of institutional success, which include property rights, 
contract enforcement, etc.  Specifically, the argument for the critical role of institutions for 
long run economic performance, sustainability, and development is written North (1990) in 
a seminal work of Douglass North.   
“I wish to assert a fundamental role for institutions in societies: they are the 
underlying determinants of the long-run performance of economies – Third World countries 
are poor because the institutional constraints define a set of pay-offs to political/economic 
activity that do not encourage productive activity.” 
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More recently, the disciples of this school of thought include Daron Acemoglu, 
James Robinson, Simon Johnson, and Dani Rodrik.  For instance, North (1990) and Olson 
(1982) argue that absence of secure property rights and contract enforcement, discourages 
investment and specialization.  Furthermore, Acemoglu (2008) and Robinson (2008) insist 
that extractive institutions that serve an elite prevent economic transformation in the form 
of “creative destruction”, technological innovation, and industrial reconversion.  An 
interesting input Rodrick (2008) specifically declares why institutions must exist to give 
way to economic activity: “markets require institutions because they are not self-creating; 
self-regulating; self-stabilizing; or self legitimizing.”  In essence, institutions are the 
groundwork for innovation, productivity, and interactions between individuals, government, 
society, etc.  Furthermore, Bardhan (1999) and Udry (1999) shed light on the difficulties for 
bringing about institutional change.  They argue that collective action problems spawn 
conflicts arising because of vested interests, the free-rider problem (a classic approach to 
social conflict in microeconomics), and bargaining problems also studied by Robock (1971) 
and De la Torre (1981).      
 The growth literature is also of great interest because growth can be a proxy for 
development and has been frequently modeled given different explanatory variables.  The 
beginning of growth literature is clearly marked by Solow (1956) and the neoclassical 
growth model where capital (K) and labor (L), and ultimately the combination of these; 
result in productivity and output.  The variable A represents the technology parameter 
commonly found in the growth literature.     
 
GDP = 𝑓(A,K,L)                           (1) 
 
The empirical literature on growth can be traced to Barro (1991), Romer (1986; 
1990), Mankiw (1992), Durlauf, S. N. (2008), Kourtellos, A. (2008), Tan, C.M. (2008), 
Henderson, D.J. (2012), Papageorgiou, C. (2012), and Parmeter, C.F. (2012) as 
recognizable authors in contemporary economics.  The growth functions included in these 
papers acknowledge the presence of human capital as building blocks for growth in the long 
run.  Growth can be separated into two blocks: short term growth, where macroeconomic 
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stability is essential, and long term growth where Solow’s neoclassical function is the pillar 
for any discussion.   The neoclassical approach also takes into account the Inada conditions 
(1963), which are extremely important in achieving long run growth considering steady 
state constraints for all nations.   
 lim!→!𝑓! 𝑘 =   ∞ 1and lim!→!𝑓!(𝑘) =   0 1                      (2) 
 lim!→!𝑓! 𝐿 =   ∞ 1and lim!→!𝑓!(𝐿) =   0 1                        (3) 
 
Basically, if capital accumulation tends to infinity, returns on capital will dwindle 
and tend to zero.  Countries with low productivity and factor accumulation can rapidly 
experience huge gains in growth as they close the gap on more advanced economies.   
 
V. Hypothesis 
 Better institutions (that allow for individual achievement and technological change), 
which translate into non-extractive institutions, allow countries to present higher levels of 
growth and prosperity for its people.  Extractive institutions may be able to attain wealth or 
even economic growth but this may not be sustainable and may not lead towards long-lived 
prosperity.  Extractive regimes do not make short-term sacrifices nor do they promote 
technological change that might threaten their rule.  Countries that have institutions that 
stimulate creativity, individual liberties, and market-oriented incentives are better suited for 
economic growth (North, 1991).  Better yet, countries that present better institutional 
development will have a higher GDP over the long run than those that do not.   
 
VI.  Methodology 
The empirical aspect of this paper provides evidence based on streams of thought 
that propagate through the new institutional economics literature.  After conducting a 
literature review that gathers evidence that institutions affect growth and long run economic 
performance of nations, I propose a model that could shed light on these arguments.   
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Therefore, I follow econometric measurement specifications as proposed by 
Mirestean and Tsangarides (2009) to identify a basic empirical growth model consisting of 
cross-country panel data using OSL estimation methods.   The use of panel data sets is 
advantageous Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998) compared to cross-section models and 
traditional time-series analysis in studying a dependent variable’s overall change or specific 
change, for instance a given country’s change.  The equation will have growth as the 
dependent variable and the econometric specification will be as follows: 
 𝐺𝑟!,! =   𝛼! +   𝛼! ∗ 𝑋!,! + 𝛼! ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡!,! + 𝜆! + 𝛽! + 𝜀!,!                 (4) 
 
where Xi,t denotes a vector for control variables that includes initial income, investment, 
debt, population growth, inflation, life expectancy, and openness to trade, which are found 
to be the remaining robust determinants of growth as suggested by Miresteans and 
Tsangarides (2009).  The 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 variable denotes my measure for institutional development 
via a proxy  variable known as the Polity IV variable, which will be discussed in more 
detail in the following (data) section.   
Conceptually speaking, institutions are characterized Rodrick (2000) as follows: 
property rights and legally binding contracts, regulatory institutions, institutions for 
macroeconomic stability, social insurance institutions, and institutions of conflict 
management.  Property rights are considered an important condition for asserting the level 
of institutional development found in a particular country (North, 1991).  Economic 
freedom should be at the core of the model, because of the value it places on institutions 
and the impact more democratic societies could have on economic growth.  Also, freedom 
from corruption, social capital, government accountability, and patent rights are part of the 
key to capturing institutions.    
The Wall Street Journal and The Heritage Foundation define economic freedom as 
“the fundamental right of every human to control his or her own labor and property.”  This 
basically states the underlying motives behind a free market economy, where market forces 
driven by incentives and rational individual agents become the norm for society.  
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Macroeconomic stability is accounted for in this model, where I will use inflation (GDP 
deflated) as a measure of short-term stability, or the central component of short-term 
growth.   Conflict resolution or social interaction is very distinct and cannot be generalized, 
since it depends on country heterogeneity factors such as religion, tradition, culture, etc.  
This will be accounted for Mirestean and Tsangarides (2009) by including country fixed 
effects for unobserved heterogeneity, robustness checks that include time trends, 
multicollinearity tests, outlier filters (for countries that present growth rates greater than 
15% or lower than -15%), and lagged explanatory variables to correct for reverse causality 
problems common in the growth regressions.3 
Specifically, the variables to include in the model are real GDP per capita (as proxy 
for measuring prosperity or success), investment, inflation, debt, openness population 
growth, life expectancy and a measure for institutions (degree of democratic or autocratic 
governance).  These variables are carefully selected based on seminal works in the growth 
literature Mirestean and Tsangarides (2009), but there is also an innovative approach that 
seeks to capture the relevance of institutions for the economic success and prosperity of 
nations.  Also, I justify selecting the control variables proposed by the latter authors, 
because they conduct a rigorous econometric analysis of 42 variables frequently included in 
growth regressions.  Their paper concludes that these seven variables are the only ones 
remaining robust after accounting for endogeneity, model uncertainty, and dynamics.    
 
 
 
VII.  Data 
 The data set includes all available data (1960-2011 for most control variables), 
which will attempt to be robust in nature.  Also, I take five-year averages to filter out 
business cycles (usually lasting 3-5 years) that increase volatility in short term growth, 
which distracts from the long run focus of this model.  Furthermore, I will construct a 
generic, unbiased model that clearly models growth for all countries without special 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See (Temple, 1999).  Model selection is also a well-known problem in the empirical growth 
literature.   
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treatment to factors such as geography, climate, resource abundance, and others.  The final 
sample includes 214 countries with available data to include in the regression.  The data 
sets will be constructed from sources freely available on the web.  These sources include: 
The World Bank Data, the Penn World Tables, and the Polity IV Index (specifically the 
Polity2 variable).4  The Polity IV index is an extensive time series data set going back to the 
19th century and including measurements of democratic or autocratic presence in most 
countries.   
Table 1 
Polity2 Variable Specification 
Interval Denotation Meaning 
From -10 to -6 Autocracy Citizens’ participation and 
political engagement is largely 
suppressed. 
From -5 to 0 Anocracy (closed) Citizens are subjected to the rule 
of  “elites” and central authority is 
weak; political instability. 
From 1 to 5 Anocracy (open) Elites are in power but there is a 
more central rule that reduces 
instability. 
From 6 to 10 Democracy Citizens can actively engage in 
political arenas and are entitled to 
economic and civil liberties. 
5 
 I choose the Polity IV variable based on multiple reasons.  First, the model looks to 
capture the long run effects of institutions on growth, so it evidently needs a long time 
series.  I considered using the variable property rights from the Heritage Foundation data 
set but was constrained by limited data before 1990.  The Polity IV variable dates all the 
way back to the 19th century, which is perfectly suited for growth analyses.  The Polity IV 
variable is essentially a condensed version of the Polity variable with a slight “fix” that 
makes it a better match for time series analysis.  It is better for time series analyses because 
the variable is on a smaller scale (-10 to 10), aiding in time series stationarity, while 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  The Polity2 variable is normally referred to as the Polity IV variable in the literature.  I will refer 
to it as Polity IV throughout the paper, although it is labeled Polity2 in the annexes.  	  
5Source: Global Report 2009: Conflict, Governance, and State Fragility 
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dropping observations with no data.  The general classification of regimes includes: 
interruption, transitions, and total collapse.  Interruption periods, for example, can be 
temporary military occupations during war times.  Total collapse periods include events 
such as in Lebanon (1978-1986) where the central government rule was so diminished it 
only exercised authority in a few blocks of Beirut.  Transition periods are viewed rather 
favorably for the construction of this index, because transitions often lead to more 
democratic initiatives that lead to more inclusive societies.  More specifically, the Polity IV 
variable is considered an accurate proxy for institutions because it captures the notion of 
economic and civil liberties, which are at the core of free market economies and incentive 
oriented competitive marketplaces.  Although one variable cannot account for every 
measure of institutions, rating political regimes is a reasonable approximation for 
identifying good institutions as well as poor institutional development (Marshall and Cole, 
2009). 
 
VIII.  Conceptual Model 
a) Theoretical Framework 
Although it is vital to use data to assess the impact of institutions on growth, it is 
also critical to state concrete economic realities.  Classical and neoclassical growth models 
such as Solow and Ramsey have come up short in explaining why certain countries fail to 
grow.  Some countries with adequate factor accumulation, i.e. capital accumulation and 
productive workers, do not present successful economic outcomes.  Saudi Arabia presents a 
vibrant economy because of high oil prices, even if many citizens’ welfare is not improved.  
The “modernization theory” implies that greater economic achievement will translate in a 
country’s cry for democracy and economic and civil liberties (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012).  This is often not the case, because some countries achieve economic gains not 
because of increased productivity and technological change but instead boast good results 
based on the findings of precious, natural resources.  For example, Venezuela may achieve 
increased oil exports and better revenues due to oil prices, but high oil prices represent 
wealth for an elite and do not magnify on the whole population because of the presence of 
“extractive” institutions.  On the other hand, if a nation changes its productive scheme to 
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create greater incentives for workers, better living standards, than this will potentially live 
up to the modernization theory of bringing about change.   
Long-term growth is an indispensable prerequisite for better country performance 
down the road.  A country must grow to elevate its GDP per capita and to bump up share in 
world trade.  Furthermore, international trade is essential for all nations in a globalized 
world.  China has been very successful in recognizing the forces of globalization and using 
it in its favor.  China has a large population, which can produce goods at low costs, and 
compete in many markets around the world.  Many high middle-income countries such as 
Brazil may get caught up in what Michael Spence calls a “middle-income trap.”  What this 
means is that rising wages will decrease marginal profits and competitiveness will be 
evaporated both domestically and abroad.  This middle-income plight plagues many 
emerging countries that need to survive this phase in order to enter the developed world.  
Emerging economies must aspire to high institutional achievement I order to constantly 
create new investment opportunities to escape from this trap.  China is pressing ahead, in 
essence, due to its relentless attitude towards “catch up growth.”  If China’s GDP is far 
from its steady state, then it can potentially grow at rates close to 10% and close the gap on 
the U.S. economy.  
Institutions as captured in my empirical model range from democratic to autocratic. 
Democratic institutions can spawn technological change, encourage foreign direct 
investment, and catapult nations to higher standards of living.  This has to do with market 
incentives and open economies.  China is a very interesting example of economic success 
(high growth rates, autocratic rule, and technological initiative.  Much has been debated 
about intentional Chinese devaluation of currency in order to compete abroad, and other 
unorthodox maneuvers that make it the unique economy that it is.  There are perhaps two 
possible outcomes for China:  
 
1) It will live up to the “modernization theory” when Chinese workers begin to demand a 
higher standard of living and more freedom 
2) It is living a phase of “catch up growth” because of its previous dormant economy shut 
off to foreigners.   
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Empirically, models will not relate well to the China effect, but for robustness effects, 
African countries normally present strong evidence for institutional struggles negatively 
affecting growth and deteriorating general levels of well-being.  India is a more democratic 
than China but does not match China in its unparalleled growth rates for different reasons.   
 
Table 2 The China vs India Dilemma 
China India 
Distinct autocracy, central rule is supreme World’s largest democracy, but plagued by 
corruption 
Growth rates around 8-10% GDP Grows at approximately 6-8% GDP 
6 
This case is a baffling conundrum because more democracy does not seem to 
translate into higher growth rates in the short run.  This is perhaps the most cited counter 
example to institutional approaches to growth.  The heart of the question is definitely the 
long-term sustainability aspect of China’s remarkable growth.  Many argue there might be a 
bubble phenomenon in China, while others argue catches up growth, or many decide to 
attribute this success to sheer numbers and size.  China has the largest population on Earth 
and can generate powerful internal demand for goods and services, which enables the 
economy to push through global economic setbacks.   
 African countries are at the center of all discussions related to inequality, poverty, 
and slow growth.  The geography theories are not too compelling in Africa because African 
countries are blessed with great natural endowments that high growth southwest Asian 
economies can only dream about.  Analytically, institutions need to be studies from a 
historical perspective, because the historical factors ultimately determine present outcomes.  
African countries mirror many Latin American countries in civil strife, corrupt 
governments, fear of creative destruction by elites, among many other characteristics.  
Natural resources can artificially boost an economy when prices for these are high, but it is 	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not a fundamental determinant of growth because it does not breed greater productivity or 
technological progress.  In fact, Jeffrey Sachs has argued for a “natural resource curse” in 
Africa, which means that having access to plentiful resources becomes burdensome for 
some countries.   
  An interesting case of natural resources providing an economic boost and then 
more inclusive economic institutions is the case of Botswana.  This southern African 
country became a diamond powerhouse in the 1970s and the government was very diligent 
in using its increased revenue to improve its fiscal balance sheet and increase government 
spending in productive fashion (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012).  Botswana’s economy 
improved and better institutions allowed the country to develop more desirably than its 
African counterparts Sierra Leone and Angola.  So, natural resources are obviously positive 
for a country because it can harness its fiscal base and invest in projects that can produce 
long-term gains.  Furthermore, they can also be a “curse” as Jeffrey Sachs has notably 
stated because it produces perverse incentives for elites to extract and ignore productivity as 
a whole (Warner and Sachs, 1995). 
 
       b) Historical Perspective 
Over the last two hundred years, Latin America and the Caribbean regions have 
struggled in developing growth patterns similar to their North American and European 
counterparts.  Although Mexico and Peru were once home to the greatest civilizations in 
human history, those days brushed past as the Spanish Conquistadores arrived in the region 
during the sixteenth century.  The mighty Aztec and Inca Empires were rapidly deceived 
and soon conquered and forced into organized labor.  The case of Latin America is very 
interesting because there is a structural shift from a notable civilization to a poverty stricken 
continent.  Furthermore, North America also experimented with a similar trend but headed 
in a different direction.  North America initially had a more scattered, primitive society 
based on hunter gathering in order to subsist.  However, the 18th century for the North 
American continent was instrumental in transitioning a sleepy economy into a world power 
on political and economic fronts. 
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Many questions have puzzled economists, geographers, political scientists, and 
historians about the growth divergence of the Americas.  To state it bluntly, North America 
steered North and South America pulled South.  Many hypotheses have been discussed 
regarding the economic differences between the two sister continents.  These possible 
explanations have pinpointed issues concerning geographic factors, climate factors, cultural 
factors, and even biological and evolutionary based arguments.  Some economists such as 
Jeffrey Sachs have adhered to the hypothesis of hot, tropic climates correlating with the 
poverty and poor development of Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and many others.  
Evolutionary biologists are quick to quote Darwin and state that all species react and adapt 
to their environment and social encounters.  These arguments can surely correlate with 
economic realities but are scarcely ever empirically proved. 
Clearly, functioning institutions are the epicenter of advanced countries with good 
governance and enviable levels of welfare.  If neighboring regions of the world display 
substantial developmental divergences, this simply cannot be explained by geographic 
factors or natural endowments.  Ironically, countries that are resource blessed display 
horrible, corrupt institutions that do not promote equality and do not bring about progress 
for its general population.  Many oil-producing countries are “rich” if and only if oil prices 
remain high and stable in the foreseeable future.  Saudi Arabia and Kuwait benefit amply 
from bountiful oil possession but their neighboring countries Egypt and Syria tend to be 
more corrupt and devastatingly poor (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).  The leading scholarly 
consensus (while considering constant factor accumulation) on why some nations are 
wealthy while others are extremely poor can be attributed to varying levels of institutional 
development.   
Until the Inca and Aztec Empires came into contact with the Spanish, they had 
developed a very unique and advanced society for their time.  The people of these empires 
did not live in chaos and constant feuding, but rather venerated an emperor and built a 
society similar in hierarchy to the Roman Empire.  North America was never home to a 
dominant empire, but was populated by Native Americans of Asian descent who 
presumably crossed the Bering Strait from one continent to the other before continents 
began to drift apart.  These new populations in North America were self-sufficent 
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communities that relied on hunting and fishing to survive.  They never united with other 
tribes under a single banner, yet these tribes lasted for centuries before the arrival of the 
Europeans.   
The arrival of Spaniards in South America soon translated into an authoritarian 
regime and a mercantile-based economy.  The Spanish exploited the natives and disguised 
Christian preaching while exploiting and savagely extracting gold and silver from the land.  
The Spanish monarchy was set on conquering the Americas and using its riches to build a 
powerful Spanish Empire that could control the seas and dominate international commerce.  
At the time of the Spanish plunder of Latin America, England was a mere European country 
struggling to fall apart due to Wars of the Roses which was bloody and prolonged civil war.  
In effect, Spain was a world power during the fifteenth century and evidently beat the 
English in conquering the Americas.   
The comparison between political and social developments in North America and 
Latin America illustrate significant outcomes.  For instance, the Spanish monarchy is 
relatively more absolutist, centralist, and authoritarian, which breeds inequality among its 
citizens (Ocampo, 2007).  The English legacy in America is based on meritocracy, 
competency, and the liberty of profession, private property, and social progress.  Many 
theories have arisen loosely explaining economic realities among nations based on cultural, 
demographic, geographic, and climatic factor that do not adequately justify economic 
performance.  
There is no empirical evidence strong enough to affirm that geographic factors make 
a difference in affecting growth.  Most people are aware of the dissimilar paths taken by the 
two Koreas after the Demilitarized Zone was installed in 1953 (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012).  North Korea has been an oppressive, communist country that has extracted 
economic benefit for the elite at the cost of poverty and inhumane conditions for the general 
population.  Contrary to this story, South Korea has grown impressively since the DMZ 
divide and its living standards rival that of any developed country in the west.  There is no 
relevant geographic, cultural, demographic, or even religious difference between these two 
nations that would empirically support divergence in growth.  What is truly evident is the 
opposite institutional arrangements that allow South Korea to have an incentive-based 
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economy where individuals are motivated to achieve higher education and finally to seek 
success in the workforce.  Extractive institutions such as the one led by the North Korean 
government, antagonizes individual liberties, incentives, and the accumulation of capital 
and productivity gains.  A bizarre case of growth under extractive institutions is the Soviet 
success story under tight communist rule.  This regime achieved growth over several 
decades, but eventually collapsed because there was no “creative destruction” or 
materialization of innovative technologies that would replace obsolete business models.  
What is the point of educating oneself, starting a business, if no profits will ever be enjoyed 
by the entrepreneur under poor institutional presence?   
Another interesting case that alludes to Table 1 are the distinct differences between 
English and Spanish legacies in the Americas.  Although, the English legacy in North 
America prevailed in setting up successful institutions that wholeheartedly embraced the 
Industrial Revolution, this was not to be the case in other parts of the world.  English 
colonies such as Barbados, Nevis, and Jamaica have been poverty stricken and often 
corrupt over the course of history.  So, the idea that cultural or historical influence is a 
factor in achieving growth does not receive overwhelming support.  Besides, the British 
Empire dominated the seas in the 18th century and where able to travel, conquer, and 
plunder around the globe.  
The English people suffered enormously during the Middle Ages where they were 
frequently invaded and conquered by nomadic tribes or the Spanish.  The Bubonic plague 
in the 14th century wiped out one third of Europe’s population and devastatingly struck the 
English people while many implored the contrary.  This plague that began in China and 
rapidly spread through contact with European traders along the Silk Road was a testament 
of weak medical and biological knowledge at the time concerning plagues, epidemics, and 
diseases.  Britain was very poor and disorganized for much of the Middle Ages and even at 
the time of the Spanish conquistas of Latin America.  Moreover, the English did not 
colonize North America because it was a nicer piece of land, but because Latin America 
was already Spanish territory for centuries.     
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Table 2: Historical Basis Of Contrasts Between the Economic and Political Systems of 
the United States and Latin America   
 
HISTORICAL FACTORS NORTH AMERICA LATIN AMERICA 
Colonial Emigration Policy Unrestricted as to nationality 
and religion. 
Limited to Roman Catholics 
loyal to the crown 
Profile of European Colonists Farmers and tradesmen; 
arrived with wives  
or families, prepared to settle 
permanently 
Peasant soldiers; sought to 
return after making a quick 
fortune; intermarried with 
native women 
 
Profile of indigenous  
inhabitants 
 
Loosely organized,  
egalitarian; small population 
 
Complex and  
stratified social structure; 
large population 
Population growth 
 
Rapid 
 
Initially negative, then slow 
 
Primary labor force 
 
European colonists 
 
Indigenous and  
African slaves 
 
Religion permitted 
 
Any Christian denomination 
 
Roman Catholic only 
 
Independence significance 
 
Popular revolution against 
economic and political 
repression 
Changed only lyrics 
 of economic tune;  
elitist musical  
score remained unchanged 
 
Access to power 
 
Through impartial law 
 
Through personal patronage 
 
Responsibility for  
one’s welfare 
 
Individual 
 
Boss and in-group 
 
Hiring and promotion criteria 
 
Performance and skills 
 
Family and  
social background 
 
Social governance basis 
Government Type 
Rule of law 
Federalist power 
Rule of men 
Centralist power 
Primary role of military Defend against  
external threat 
Defend against  
internal threat 
7 
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The Industrial Revolution is a fascinating period of time because it is an inflection 
point in history of economic growth and development.  Before the Industrial Revolution, 
growth was not a priority or even an economic model of any sort.  Sure, the Mayan 
civilization was very successful for its time, or even the Roman Empire conquered much of 
Europe and spread into Africa; but they never achieved sustained growth.  The concept of 
sustained growth is one that underpins the theories behind successful institutions.  
When the Industrial Revolution was in full throttle, it brought about changes in 
production, labor organization, management strategies, and the role of government, 
including many others.  Perhaps the causes of the Industrial Revolution can be traced 
throughout history in the societal development that allowed nomads or travelers to settle 
and become sedentary people.  From sedentary life, human populations began to grow, 
especially during more peaceful times, as was the case in 18th century England.  As 
populations grew, then so did cities and industrial activities.   
So why did the Industrial Revolution take place, and why in Great Britain?  Many 
academics have suggested cultural, historical, and non-economic factors to pinpoint the 
Industrial Revolution to Great Britain and why in Glasgow instead of Paris.  There are 
ongoing debates divided into two main streams of influence: the economic grounded 
arguments and the non-economic factors that could have influenced the Industrial 
revolution.  Significant technological advances included the spinning jenny, the steam 
engine, coke smelting, and many others marked by this English revolution.  If one adopts a 
microeconomic theory grounded argument, it is important to note that England had high 
real wages in the 18th century, accompanied by low prices for capital and energy goods 
(Allen, 2010).  The implications of this assessment include that individuals had a strong 
purchasing power, while enterprises had clear incentives to invest in capital and technology 
due to cheap prices compared to other countries in Europe.  England evidently decided to 
take the lead and invest in technology, which consequently provided innovations and huge 
gains in productivity.   
It is important to note that the expansion of factories, labor efficiency, and increased 
output were vital determinants of this revolution.  English factories adopted what would 
later surge formally as “Scientific Mangement” proposed by American mechanical engineer 
	  	   23	  
Frederick Taylor.  He emphasized efficiency, automation, compensation incentives, and 
cost reductions via technological improvements.   
Microeconomic theory is helpful in understanding why businesses chose to invest 
and in explaining why new inventions were marketable and profitable.  Technology was 
expanding on both sides of the supply and demand equation.  Low prices spiked demand for 
technology because it would make work easier and perhaps increase leisure time for 
business owners.  On the supply side, higher wages translated into more education, 
improved lifestyles, and a stronger consumer market.  Management theory is helpful in 
understanding how economic incentives were effectively used inside the workplace to 
motivate employees and to create a new group of powerful consumers.  
 Taylorism was not yet incorporated into formal language, but the Industrial 
Revolution created harsh work environment for the working class since for the first time in 
history, workers took to the cities and to factory life.8  Quite noticeably, harsh work 
environments and mind-bending, long shifts were put in place at this time, because only in 
the 20th century would business leaders begin to consider organizational behavior, work 
environment, and non economic motivational factors that are instrumental to business 
success.  It makes perfect sense why the Industrial Revolution bred great economic 
prosperity for Great Britain, but also why the Marxist doctrine quickly arose in protest.  
Never before had mankind witnessed the ability to constantly accumulate capital and to 
boost productivity.  Karl Marx would protest that exploitation and salaries near subsistence 
levels were the result of this magnified capitalism that would eventually lead into crisis or 
recession.  It turns out capitalist societies are governed by boom and bust business cycles, 
but they do lead to highly competitive market places that boost innovation.   
The Industrial Revolution analysis leads to an exciting framework where the world 
economy splits into two: the before and after.  Perhaps institutions have become relevant in 
market-oriented societies of today, but were not so important in the past.  When I mention 
institutions, I refer to and emphasize economic incentives as the drivers of shifting the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Taylorism is a management theory that emphasizes economic efficiency and labor productivity 
without taking into consideration human relationships, employee happiness, well-being, and other 
non-monetary incentives.  
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supply curve to the right and catapulting productivity to all time highs.  In closed 
economies, economic competition is naturally less fierce than in open, globally integrated 
markets.  Tribal societies of the past based on subsistence economies or barter economies 
were not affected by positive or negative institutional inputs.  These societies were surely 
affected by clan disputes, wars, and aggression that severely deteriorated their way of life.  
Institutions in the past were critical to maintaining order, harmony, and balance in society.  
They were not however a decisive factor in economic growth, simply because societies had 
not evolved into measuring and competing in free markets.  
 
Chart 1 Evolution of Economic System 
9 
I previously mentioned economic growth before and after the Industrial Revolution, 
that basically refers to Adam Smith’s novel work in The Wealth of Nations where 
capitalism as we know it was born.  Division of labor, capital accumulation, supply and 
demand, and competition were the fundamental determinants of economic growth and the 
long run success of nations.  This theory continues to be the leading economic theory that 
encourages free markets, basic government intervention, and international trade.  
Recent forces as those mentioned in step three of the Chart 1, indicate that times 
have changed since Adam Smith.  Information technology and innovation are accelerating 
at unprecedented rates, while global integration and capital flows are more articulated than 
ever before.  Just a casual observation of the Colombian economy shows that 80% of 	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exports are heading towards the U.S. and Europe.  In the 18th century Europe traded with 
Middle Eastern and African countries but time and distance made inter-European trade the 
logical path to pursue.  In today’s world catch-up growth and knowledge transfer are crucial 
factors in the world economy.  These create dynamics because globalized economies that 
are largely integrated can learn from their peers rapidly and at diminishing marginal costs, 
which lead to spillover effects and externalities.  Some notable examples are China, Brazil, 
South Africa, India, and essentially the emerging market economies that continue to grow 
at an alarming pace.   
Large, developed economies such as the U.S., Canada, France, the United Kingdom, 
and others cannot grow at the pace of India.  They are close to their steady state and are 
developed, world powers that reach diminishing marginal returns for factor accumulation.  
As emerging economies transition into advanced country status, the existing developed 
countries can potentially begin a renovation period of high growth due to the beginning of 
new technologies and less knowledge transfer.  This knowledge transfer creates what 
Spence (2011) calls the convergence of nations.  He argues that high-speed growth 
economies face potential financial crises fueled by exhilaration from growth and high 
leverage in capital markets.  These countries need to balance this high-powered growth with 
caution and regulatory evolution so that they do not spin out of control and create a crisis 
similar to 2008 that radiates on a global scale.   
 Why is catch up growth and economic convergence important?  It is significant 
because it means that in a global economy it is easier for countries to learn from others and 
possible that emerging economies will eventually equal they’re once innovative, and 
creative peers that generated great knowledge and consequently substantial wealth. 
Essentially, institutions should converge so that growth and distribution of the former can 
be optimal.  Institutional development is not steering in the path of convergence, but rather 
many dissimilar institutions are being installed possibly because of large economic 
incentives.  
 Emerging economies and advanced economies will likely converge in the future 
and reach new heights of wealth.  Poor countries will lag behind because of corruption and 
detrimental institutions and finally economic prosperity is bound to diverge.  By referring to 
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one of my previous points about “creative destruction,” I can make a case for divergence 
between emerging country growth and underdeveloped country growth as deriving from 
knowledge transfer.  Emerging economies obviously want to grow and benefit from 
knowledge transfer in order to close the gap with advanced economies.  Countries rampant 
with corrupt governments and failed institutions extract wealth and have no interest in 
creating political risk for their own regimes by allowing knowledge transfers, globally 
integrated communications, no Internet censorship, etc.   
 
IX.  Results 
 
a) Main Findings 
 The empirical model suggests good institutions, as discussed throughout the paper, 
positively affect growth.  The initial hypothesis was grounded on a review of the literature 
and an a priori understanding of the subject matter that led this paper in the direction of 
modeling the Polity IV variable against growth.  In the annexes that follow, I show that 
institutions as captured by the Polity IV variable prove to be significant at the 1% level.  
Precisely, the main results table (below) shows 1% positive significance levels for all six 
specifications displayed.  The first regression models the Polity IV variable against growth, 
and the following regressions subsequently add a new independent variable until including 
the entire model specification as expressed in equation (4).  This regression table includes 
country fixed effects for all six regressions and the Polity IV variable proves to be 
significant on the 1% level in all six specifications.  I acknowledge institutions can be 
accounted for with multiple variables and it is possible that one specification can produce 
results that differ from another.  I was able to confirm Acemoglu et al (2001) where 
institutional development is a key driver for growth as displayed in the main results table 
below.   
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***Main Regression Table with Country Fixed-Effects (dummy variable) 
 
  
(1) 
Rate 
(2) 
Rate 
(3) 
Rate 
(4) 
Rate 
(5) 
Rate 
(6) 
Rate 
POLITY2 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.112*** 0.104*** 0.092*** 0.101*** 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) 
II 
 
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GCF 
  
-0.046* -0.042* -0.049* -0.051* 
   
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.024) 
POP 
   
-0.293 -0.268 -0.236 
    
(0.175) (0.185) (0.192) 
LE 
    
0.028 0.028 
     
(0.025) (0.022) 
INF 
     
-0.001 
      
(0.000) 
OPEN 
     
-0.001 
      
(0.006) 
_cons 1.673*** 0.881*** 5.984*** 2.298*** 0.566 1.795 
  (0.210) (0.019) (0.637) (0.580) (1.508) (1.507) 
N 1258 1204 1133 1133 1133 1110 
R-sq 0.281 0.350 0.384 0.388 0.389 0.398 
Standard errors in parentheses 
	   	   	   	  * p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
	   	   	   	   
 Aside from the Polity IV variable, I naturally followed the regression specification 
as proposed by Mirestean and Tsangarides (2009) and was able to confirm most results 
from economic theory.  Capital gross formation as a fundamental variable in the Solow-
Swan model proved significant in all four specifications presented in the following table, 
where one can see how a 1% increase in GCF translates into a 0.077% increase in growth.  
This was to be expected because capital accumulation and factor accumulation are 
essentially the underlying economic principles behind long run economic growth as 
expressed in equation (1).  
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  The main regressions table displays 5% positive significance for GCF under five 
different specifications.  Also, this was verified by using fixed effects and a balanced panel 
data set that drops countries for which there were observations lacking within the time 
period 1960-2011 and the results were also positive at varying significance levels as shown 
in the (Balanced Panel Data Set) table (below).  Incorporating balanced panel data is 
advantageous (see Wooldridge, 2006, for instance) because it minimizes biased estimators 
that may result from unobserved factors that change over time.  Regarding openness 
Andersen (2008) and Babula (2008) review the most cited empirical analyses and find that 
openness is positively significant but particularly for developed countries that can readily 
benefit from trade liberalization.  Countries with underdeveloped institutions, property 
rights, economies of scale, i.e. are not likely to benefit from increased trade exposure.   
Life expectancy can have a positive effect on growth when impact on technology 
and human capital is large, and when diminishing results are limited (Acemoglu and 
Johnson, 2007).  Reverse causality (where y affects x, just as x affects y), is highly 
prevalent in growth regressions and I ran regressions using lagged variables in an attempt to 
correct for this specification problem (see Temple, 1999, for a discussion of using lagged 
variables).  It is possible that at a macro level, higher life expectancy spurs higher incomes, 
but also richer countries could present higher life expectancies because of stronger health 
care systems. Life expectancy proved to be positively significant in the following 
regression table under the balanced equation specification in column (5).  Initial income 
was significant in all column specifications of the main table in annex 3, but negatively 
affected growth.  This could be explained by the steady state theory from the growth 
literature as exemplified by the Inada conditions in equations (2) and (3).         
 Based upon my data analysis before running regressions, it was decided that the 
debt variable should be omitted given the low number of observations.  This decision 
should not affect the model because the correlation matrix in annex 2 does not show a very 
strong relationship between debt and the Polity IV variable.  Including this variable would 
greatly decrease overall observations and I had already lost plenty of observations because I 
decided to work with five-year averages for the 1960-2011 time period.  
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 Inflation has an interesting affect on growth, because the impact depends on the 
varying degrees of inflation rates as suggested by Barro (2013).  Inflation rates close to 
10% can hinder growth, although the impact of high inflation is most noticeable for long 
term decreases in standards of living.  Inflation was insignificant in empirical analyses 
presented in this paper  
 
***Balanced Panel Data Set (No Fixed Effects) 
 
  
(1) 
Rate 
(2) 
Rate 
(3) 
Rate 
(4) 
Rate 
(5) 
Rate 
(6) 
Rate 
POLITY2 0.024 0.040* 0.037* 0.011 -0.001 0.011 
 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
year 0.015* 0.014 0.020** 0.015* 0.008 0.011 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
II 
 
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
-
0.000*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GCF 
  
0.077*** 0.073** 0.061* 0.056* 
   
(0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.028) 
POP 
   
-0.406** -0.338* -0.301 
    
(0.152) (0.153) (0.154) 
LE 
    
0.039* 0.034 
     
(0.018) (0.018) 
INF 
     
-0.000 
      
(0.000) 
OPEN 
     
0.003 
      
(0.003) 
_cons -28.15 -25.35 -39.23** -28.12 -17.83 -21.95 
  (14.74) (14.57) (13.83) (14.76) (15.75) (17.07) 
N 1258 1204 1133 1133 1133 1110 
R-sq 0.006 0.011 0.056 0.077 0.084 0.084 
Standard errors in parentheses 
	   	   	   	  * p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
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b) Robustness Checks 
 
 Various robustness checks were included in the empirical work of this paper.  All 
estimations were done using 5-year averages with lagged explanatory variables.  The 
following table includes country fixed effects, while the preceding table presents a 
robustness check by estimating a balanced panel data model that drops country observations 
for time periods 1960-2011 where data is lacking.  The ensuing table essentially replicates 
the main results table, but adds on the robustness checks by filtering data and excluding 
growth rates below -15% and those that exceed 15%.  The Polity IV variable shows positive 
significance again at the 1% level, and aids in verifying the validity of my regression 
analysis because this specification presents a cleaner dataset with observations for all 
countries throughout the time period of study.   
It is important to note the data filter used for outliers dropped a string of countries 
with atypical growth rates in the 1990s.  These countries include Serbia, Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Yugoslavia, and eastern European countries that experienced immense 
reversals of fortune after the collapse of the Berlin Wall.  The split from the Soviet Union 
represented many years of economic hardships and internal struggles that noticeably 
present unreasonable yearly growth changes around the 20% level.  The evidence is shown 
in the table below for all six regression specifications.    
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***Regressions with Country Fixed Effects and Outliers Filter 
 
 
  
(1) 
Rate 
(2) 
Rate 
(3) 
Rate 
(4) 
Rate 
(5) 
Rate 
(6) 
Rate 
POLITY2 0.102*** 0.107*** 0.113*** 0.106*** 0.086*** 0.099*** 
 
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) 
II 
 
-0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
-
0.000*** 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GCF 
  
-0.058*** -0.054*** -0.065*** 
-
0.064*** 
   
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) 
POP 
   
-0.274 -0.234 -0.216 
    
(0.173) (0.184) (0.191) 
LE 
    
0.044* 0.030 
     
(0.021) (0.021) 
INF 
     
-0.001 
      
(0.000) 
OPEN 
     
0.003 
      
(0.005) 
_cons 1.787*** 0.869*** 6.153*** 2.578*** -0.129 1.540 
  (0.194) (0.017) (0.465) (0.409) (1.323) (1.478) 
N 1247 1195 1128 1128 1128 1106 
R-sq 0.304 0.342 0.368 0.372 0.376 0.373 
Standard errors in parentheses 
	   	   	   	  * p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
	   	   	   	   
X.  Conclusion and Recommendations 
New institutional economics rose to prominence during the 1990s largely due to the 
seminal works of Douglass North regarding property rights and their impact on growth.  
Moreover, scholars such as Daron Acemoglu, Dani Rodrik, James Robinson, Robert Barro, 
and others have aided new institutional economics in complementing traditional economic 
theories regarding growth.  Institutions are characterized by historical antecedents, political 
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situations, and by incentives interacting among individuals, nations, and governments.  The 
role of institutions in economic growth was analyzed historically as well as empirically 
Acemoglu et al (2001), who introduced new variables to the classical growth regressions 
based largely upon the long heralded Solow-Swan model.  I specified a growth regression 
based on the empirical findings of Miresteans and Tsangarides (2009) and decided to 
introduce a variable that would be a proxy for institutions.   
I modeled with the Polity IV variable that depicts the degree of democracy or 
autocracy for most countries.  This variable was found to be positively significant at the 1% 
confidence level for growth under all specifications in every table, after controlling for 
country heterogeneity (via a dummy variable), and growth outliers present in the dataset.  
The regressions also confirmed statistical significance for gross capital formation (highest 
significance level), initial income (highest significance level), population growth, and life 
expectancy.  These findings are generally parallel to economic theory where capital 
accumulation (or factor accumulation), increases in the Solow-Swan model, life expectancy 
positively affects growth, and population growth is ambiguous depending o the relationship 
between population size and GDP.   
Institutions can be identified by many variables including Polity IV, but also by 
property rights, constitutions, elections, and many others.  We chose this variable due to 
data availability for the time series and also because of recommendations in the literature.  
Further studies could include other variables for institutions for perhaps a shorter time 
period.  Reverse causality and multicollinearity are prevalent problems in the growth 
literature and the paper accounted for this issue to some extent by using lagged explanatory 
variables.  More in depth statistical work needs to be done to improve empirical work in 
growth related fields.  Also, I believe country heterogeneity should definitely be taken into 
account because we made a strong case for how historical causes affect eventual 
institutional outcomes.10  These robustness tests were very important in verifying statistical 
significance for institutions, which is ultimately the main focus of this paper.  I tested a 
generic model for all countries, but further papers could concentrate on comparing and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 I control for this by using fixed effects.	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contrasting defined geographies.  For instance, one could empirically focus on the 
institutional affect on growth between North America and Latin America.  
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XII.  Appendix 
 
Annex 1  
 
Online Data Sources and Descriptions       
• http://data.worldbank.org/  
• https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt71/pwt71_form_test.php 
• http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
• http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm 
 
 
Variables Source Brief Description 
GROWTH RATE The World Bank Annual percentage growth rate of 
GDP per capita based on constant 
local currency. 
GDP PER CAPITA The World Bank Gross Domestic Product divided 
by a country's population, a good 
measure of equality and welfare. 
GROSS CAPITAL 
FORMATION 
The World Bank It is used as a proxy for investment 
following the Solow-Swan growth 
model. Includes fixed assets of an 
economy+changes in inventory. 
POPULATION GROWTH The World Bank The exponential growth rate of a 
country's population, calculated as 
a yearly variation. 
INFLATION The World Bank Annual growth rate of GDP 
implicit deflator that shows  
the rate of price changes in  
the aggregate economy. 
DEBT The World Bank It is composed of government 
fixed-term contractual obligations 
to third parties. 
LIFE EXPECTANCY The World Bank The number of years a newborn 
infant would live if mortality rates 
remained unchanged throughout 
the person's lifetime. 
OPENNESS Penn World Table 7.1 Openness to trade at 2005 constant 
prices. 
POLITY2 (POLITY IV INDEX) Polity IV Index A variable that measures varying 
levels of political freedom. 
Interval includes -10 to 10  
(-10 most autocratic, 10 mostly 
democratic) 
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  Source: Polity IV Index 
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Annex 2  Descriptive Statistics and Data Analysis 
 
 
Variable Obs.	   Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	   Min	   Max	  
year	   11128.000	   1985.500	   15.009	   1960.000	   2011.000	  
RATE	   1744.000	   2.097	   4.100	   -­‐42.809	   33.136	  
II	   1610.000	   6444.549	   10474.780	   77.662	   95885.270	  
GCF	   1396.000	   22.584	   8.242	   3.575	   86.794	  
LE	   1945.000	   62.666	   11.539	   28.871	   82.498	  
POP	   2114.000	   1.896	   1.613	   -­‐4.645	   16.245	  
INF	   1568.000	   37.787	   269.817	   -­‐17.781	   6962.832	  
DEBT	   261.000	   56.277	   39.407	   1.454	   283.745	  
OPEN	   1607.000	   70.730	   45.839	   1.868	   420.850	  
POLITY2	   1390.000	   0.534	   7.319	   -­‐10.000	   10.000	  
 
 
 
              Correlation Matrix (Multicollinearity Check) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II
GCF
LE
POP
INF
DEBT
OPEN
POLITY2
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Annex 3 
 
***All Empirical Work Done in Stata 10.1 
**Do-File for all Estimations 
 
***Regressions 
**Rename variables 
***5 Year Average with Lags 
 
*Data Analysis 
summarize 
graph matrix (xi)…, half maxis(ylabel(none) xlabel(none)) 
 
reg RATE II GCF POP LE INF OPEN POLITY2, robust 
eststo m1 
estout m1, cells(b(star fmt(3)) se(par fmt(2))) 
 
**Multicollinearity Test 
**after regression 
estat vif 
 
*Fixed Effects 
 
tabulate country, gen(x) 
tabulate year, gen(z) 
reg RATE II GCF POP LE INF OPEN POLITY x* z* 
reg RATE II GCF POP LE INF OPEN POLITY2 x* z*, robust  
**with filter 
reg RATE II GCF POP LE INF OPEN POLITY2 x*if RATE>-15 & RATE<15 
**with time trends 
reg RATEPOLITY2 II GCF POP LE INF OPEN x* year if RATE>-15 & RATE<15 
 
***Creating Output Tables 
eststo: reg RATE POLITY2, robust 
esttab raw 
 
***More Advanced 
 
reg RATE POLITY2, robust 
eststo model1 
 
reg RATE POLITY2 II, robust 
eststo model2 
 
reg RATE POLITY2 II GCF, robust 
eststo model3 
 
xi: reg POLITY2 II GCF POP LE OPEN INF, robust 
esttab, r2 ar2 se scalar(rmse) no gaps 
esttab se r2 se(3) b(3) replace drop(x* _IlanX*) 
 
